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Case Digest

The purpose of the Case Digest is to identify and summarize for the
reader those recent and interesting cases that have less significance
than those that merit an in-depth analysis. Included in the digest are
cases that apply established legal principles without necessarily
introducing new ones.
This digest includes cases reported from December 1972 through
April 1973. The Fall issue will include cases reported from May
through November, 1973. The cases are grouped into topical
categories, and references are given for further research. It is hoped
that attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that this digest
facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational law.
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1. ADMINISTRATIVE
NON-VESSEL-OPERATING
PROOF

TO JUSTIFY

COMMON

CARRIERS

THE REASONABLENESS

HAVE

BURDEN

OF

OF PROPOSED RATE IN-

CREASE IN A FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION PROCEEDING

Transconex, Inc. and Consolidated Express, Inc., both non-vesseloperating common carriers by water, filed schedules of proposed rate
increases to take effect respectively on April 30, and June 10, 1969.
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) then initiated public
investigation and hearings on April 28, and June 6, 1969, to determine
whether the increases would be unlawful under the Shipping Act of
1916 and/or the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933. The FMC did not
suspend the rate increases pending the hearing and Puerto Rico
intervened to oppose the increases. The investigation and hearings
were discontinued on the ground that Puerto Rico had failed to
discharge its burden of proving that the increases were unlawful.
Puerto Rico then petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to review this order of dismissal, contending that the burden
of proof was on the non-vessel-operating common carriers in such a
proceeding even though the FMC did not suspend the rates pending
review of their reasonableness. The court held for Puerto Rico on the
basis of congressional intent as ascertained from S. REP. No. 724,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939) and from the Intercoastal Shipping Act
of 1933, 46 U.S.C. § § 843-48 (1970). These sources allocate the
burden of proof to the carrier proposing the rate change since the
carrier is the party most likely to possess the evidence necessary to
establish the reasonableness of the change. Puerto Rico v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 468 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

2. ADMIRALTY
COMPARATIVE
ZONE

NEGLIGENCE STANDARD

COMPANY

DOES

NOT

APPLICABLE TO THE CANAL

SUPERSEDE

THE

RULE

OF

DIVIDED

DAMAGES BETWEEN VESSELS

Plaintiff's tanker, while being piloted by a Panama Canal Company
pilot, collided with a freighter owned by defendant. Plaintiff Afran
sued the freighter for damages, the freighter counterclaimed against
the tanker, and plaintiff then sought recovery from the Panama Canal
Company for any liability to the defendant. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found both plaintiff and defendant at fault, and
therefore applied the rule of divided damages whereby damages are
divided equally between the parties regardless of degree of comparaVol. 6-No. 2
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tive fault. The Panama Canal Company petitioned for rehearing,
contending that the rule of divided damages here should yield to the
comparative negligence standard, which applies in direct actions
against the Panama Canal Company pursuant to section 292 of the
Canal Zone Code. The court held that although the negligence of the
Canal Company is imputed to the tanker, the action between the
tanker and the freighter is an in rem action. Therefore, based on Burns
Bros. v. CentralR.R., 202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953), the rule of divided
damages should apply to this in rem recovery. The court upheld the
use of the rule of comparative negligence between the tanker and the
Panama Canal Company since section 292 is a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Afran Transp. Co. v. S/S Transcolorado,468 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1972).

FAILURE TO OBEY COMMANDS OF SHIP MASTER BECAUSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION CONSTITUTES WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE

Plaintiff, a seaman, claimed that an improper deduction from his
wages by defendant, his employer, entitled him to "double penalty
wages" under 46 U.S.C. § 596. Defendant asserted that plaintiff's
admitted failure to stand several prescribed watches because of
intoxication constituted the disobedience of orders necessary under
46 U.S.C. § 701 to justify a deduction of wages. The court analogized
this case to criminal cases in which voluntary intoxication does not
excuse a crime. Therefore, the court held that missing assigned
watches due to voluntary intoxication was willful disobedience and
that deduction of wages was proper. Davenport v. Albatross Tanker
Corp., 349 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

PREJUDGMENT

INTEREST

FROM

DATE

OF

JUDICIAL

DEMAND

IS

PROPER WHEN ORIGINAL ACTION AT LAW Is CHANGED TO ADMIRALTY
BY WITHDRAWAL OF JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff was injured while working on a submersible drilling barge
and brought suit for personal injuries against his employer under the
Jones Act for negligence, and under general maritime law for
unseaworthiness. Plaintiff filed his suit as a civil action and asked for a
jury trial, unavailable in admiralty actions. Three days before trial,
however, plaintiff waived his request for trial by jury. The district
court for the Eastern District of Louisiana entered judgment for
plaintiff and awarded damages including prejudgment interest from
Spring, 1973
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the date of judicial demand, a remedy available, under the Jones Act,
only in admiralty actions. Defendant appealed, contending that
plaintiff's suit was a civil action at law, not in admiralty. Therefore,
defendant alleged, the award of prejudgment interest was improper.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld plaintiff's judgment
and award of interest. The court determined that the action was in
admiralty, making prejudgment interest proper. Reasoning that the
plaintiff's original choice of the law side for his Jones Act suit was not
irrevocable, the court treated the plaintiff's withdrawal of his demand
for jury trial as an election to proceed in admiralty, notwithstanding
his failure to comply with Rules 9(h) and 15, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which require identification of a suit as an admiralty claim.
Doucet v. Wheless DrillingCo., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972).

THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ALONE HAS STANDING TO BRING A
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION IN GENERAL MARITIME LAW

Plaintiff, father of decedent, brought a wrongful death action under

the Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and general
maritime law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting
that plaintiff lacked standing to sue because he was not the personal
representative of the deceased. Conceding his lack of standing under
the Jones Act and DOHSA because he was not the personal
representative of the deceased, plaintiff nevertheless argued his
standing to sue in general maritime law actions created by Moragne v.

States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court order granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the advantages inherent in a uniform rule of standing for maritime death actions
outweigh any persuasive reason to introduce an anomaly into
maritime law, and concluded that the clear expression of congressional
intent, found in the Jones Act and DOHSA, to limit standing to sue
solely to the personal representative should apply equally to Moragne
wrongful death actions. Futch v. Midland Enterprises,Inc., 471 F.2d
1195 (5th Cir. 1973).

PERMITTING AN OBJECT NOT PART OF SHIP'S EQUIPMENT TO REMAIN
IN PLACE WHERE
UNSEAWORTHY

IT

COULD

BE

DISLODGED

CAN MAKE

VESSEL

Plaintiff, a longshoreman, sustained a severe eye injury when he was

struck by a falling object dislodged near the top of a ladder on board
Vol. 6-No. 2
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defendant's ship. The object was not a part of the ship's equipment.
Plaintiff contended that the vessel was unseaworthy and thus liable
because dangerous debris was permitted to accumulate in a place
where it could fall and injure a workman. The district court for the
Western District of Washington held that a falling object must be part
of the ship's equipment before unseaworthiness can be found. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court and held that the presence on board a ship of an object placed
near a ladder where it could be dislodged by a workman using the
ladder in a normal manner constituted an unseaworthy condition,
even though the object was not part of the ship's equipment. Griffin v.
United States, 469 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).

ORDER ON MOTION TO

STAY Is

NOT APPEALABLE

IF UNDERLYING

ACTION IS IN ADMIRALTY

In plaintiff's admiralty action seeking recovery for damage to cargo,
defendant asserted as a defense a compulsory arbitration provision of
the charter party. Six months after the filing of the complaint,
defendant moved to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the
dispute by arbitration. Holding that defendant was guilty of unreasonable delay, the district court denied the motion, and defendant
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The court
held that the denial was clearly mandated under Schoenamsgruber v.
Hamburg American Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935). That decision and
several others held that if the underlying action is one at law, a motion
to stay is in effect a motion for an injunction and its resolution is
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970). If the underlying
action is in admiralty or equity, however, the fictional injunction is
lacking and, therefore, an order on the motion to stay is not
appealable. The court noted in dicta that either Congress or the
Supreme Court should act to eliminate this incongruity. J. M. Huber &
Co. v. M/VPlym, 468 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1972).

STATUS OF SEAMAN

REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL

WORK ABOARD VESSEL

WITH SOME DEGREE OF REGULARITY AND CONTINUITY

Appellant, employed as a temporary helper on an offshore drilling
platform, suffered an injury while working on the platform. Alleging
Spring, 1973
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his status as a seaman, appellant brought an action against his
employer and others under the Jones Act and under general maritime
law. Appellant contended that his performance of certain duties,
including scraping paint and painting, for several days aboard the
tender that serviced the drilling platform made him a seaman of that
vessel. As a member of the platform crew, appellant also ate, slept and
spent his off-duty time on the tender. The sole issue before the court
was whether the duties appellant performed aboard the tender
classified him as a seaman. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit sustained the district court and held that appellant was
not a seaman under the requirement set forth in Offshore Co. v.
Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959). The court found appellant's
evidence insufficient to demonstrate that he performed a significant
portion of his work aboard the tender with some degree of regularity
and continuity. Keener v. Transworld DrillingCo., 468 F.2d 729 (5th
Cir. 1972).

ADMIRALTY COURT WILL ASSUME JURISDICTION OF ACTION BETWEEN
FOREIGN LITIGANTS UNLESS JUSTICE Is BETTER SERVED BY DENIAL

The Irish administratrix of the estate of a deceased Irish seaman
filed a wrongful death libel against defendants, a vessel of Irish
registry, her Irish corporate owner, and a Georgia corporation.
Plaintiff alleged that the deceased drowned in the Savannah River
after falling from a portable catwalk negligently maintained by the
Georgia corporation, and attached to the Irish vessel in an unseaworthy manner. The Irish defendants moved to dismiss the action on
the ground that the administratrix's residence in Ireland made a forum
there accessible for adjudication. The court noted that under the
doctrine of The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885), the assumption of
jurisdiction by United States admiralty courts in cases involving
foreign litigants is discretionary, and should be exercised unless special
circumstances and the needs of justice dictate otherwise. The court
found that the Georgia situs of the injury and the presence there of
local witnesses, the potential right of contribution between the
defendants, and, should the evidence disclose that the deceased was
contributorily negligent, the problem of apportionment of damages
between the administratrix and defendants, all could be handled best
in one action. The court, therefore, held that these questions should
be resolved in one lawsuit in the United States and not in separate
actions in different countries. Kearney v. Savannah Foods & Indus.,
Inc., 350 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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BALANCE IN FAVOR OF FOREIGN DEFENDANT MUST BE ESPECIALLY
STRONG

BEFORE

AMERICAN

PLAINTIFF'S

CHOICE

OF

DOMESTIC

FORUM WILL BE DISTURBED

Plaintiff, an American seller, brought an action for damages in the
district court for the Southern District of New York against
defendant, a French bank, for releasing shipping documents to a
French corporate buyer of plaintiff's goods contrary to plaintiff's
instructions. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the
French buyer for indemnification. The French buyer then moved to
dismiss the defendant bank's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and on the ground of forum non conveniens. The French
bank, in turn, sought dismissal of the seller's complaint on the ground
of forum non conveniens, contingent on the dismissal of its
third-party complaint. The district court dismissed both complaints on
grounds of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of seller's complaint against
defendant bank. The court found that the balance must be strongly in
favor of a foreign defendant and forum before an American plaintiff's
choice of domestic forum will be overturned. Noting that the relevant
transactions between plaintiff and defendant occurred both in the
United States and in France, and that defendant maintained a New
York office, the court found it to be no more trouble for defendant to
try the case in New York than for plaintiff to try the case in France.
The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the bank's third-party
complaint against the buyer. Since both of these parties were French
corporations, all of the relevant transactions took place in France, the
witnesses were in France, French law would apply and the buyer had
no contacts in New York, the court concluded that the third-party
action should be resolved in French courts. Olympic Corp. v. Societe
Generale, 462 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1972).

COURT ORDER DECLINING JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN PARTIES
EFFECTIVE ONLY
TO

FOREIGN

IS

ON DEFENDANT'S PROOF OF AGREED SUBMISSION

JURISDICTION

AND

COOPERATION

IN

OBTAINING

DEPOSITIONS

Plaintiff, a Spanish seaman on a vessel owned by defendant, a
German corporation, brought suit to recover damages based on claims
of unseaworthiness and negligence arising from an accident in Port
Newark, New Jersey aboard defendant's vessel. Defendant petitioned
the court to decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non
conveniens. The court evaluated the factors referred to in Lauritzen v.
Spring, 1973

CASE DIGEST
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) that are used to resolve choice-of-law
problems in maritime tort claims, and concluded that the Jones Act
and the general maritime law of the United States were not applicable.
Noting that plaintiff and all the witnesses now reside in Spain, that the
depositions of doctors in the United States easily could be obtained
and that defendant offered to submit to foreign jurisdiction and
cooperate in the taking of depositions, the court refused to retain
jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. To eliminate
prejudice to plaintiff, the court made the dismissal effective only on
defendant's proof of its submission to foreign jurisdiction and
cooperation in the taking of depositions. Rodriguez v. Orion
Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft Reith & Co., 348 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).

CHARGE

TO

DISTINGUISH

JURY

IN

MARITIME

PERSONAL

OPERATIONAL NEGLIGENCE FROM

INJURY

SUIT

MUST

UNSEAWORTHINESS

Plaintiff longshoreman was injured in an unloading accident on
defendant's ship when a fellow longshoreman improperly spotted the
boom of the ship's crane throughout the unloading operation and
caused a steel beam to slam plaintiff against the side of the ship.
Plaintiff sought recovery from defendant for personal injuries on the
ground that his fellow longshoreman's actions made the ship unseaworthy. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
charged the jury that defendant was liable if negligent acts of the
longshoreman created an unseaworthy condition aboard ship that
subsequently caused injury. The court advised the jury, however, that
unseaworthiness does not arise if the negligent act and injury are
simultaneous. Both parties found the instruction misleading; however,
the court let it stand, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found the lower court's instruction to the jury in error and vacated
the judgment. The court found confusing the instruction that there
can be no liability for unseaworthiness when the negligent act and the
injury are simultaneous. The court reasoned that the lower court's
instruction failed to explain that unseaworthiness may be found,
although the negligent act and injury are simultaneous, if the act is of
such character or duration as to constitute unseaworthiness. Therefore, the court ruled that the charge must instruct the jury to
distinguish an isolated personal act of negligence from an individual
act of such character that it becomes an unseaworthy condition of the
vessel itself. Kyzar v. Vale Do Ri Doce Navegacai,S.A., 464 F.2d 285
(5th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1973).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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COSGA,

HARTER ACT AND UNITED STATES SHIPPING ACT GOVERN IN

CASES IN WHICH TRANSPORTATION BY WATER

Is

AVERRED THOUGH

NOT ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico instituted a civil action in the
Superior Court of Puerto Rico against defendant carriers for an alleged
misdelivery of 63 trailer loads of food shipped by the United States
Government. The court granted defendant's petition for removal to
the federal district court on the grounds that both the bill of lading
contract and plaintiff's cause of action were governed by the terms
and conditions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COSGA), the
Harter Act and the United States Shipping Act. Plaintiff then moved
for remand to the Superior Court of Puerto Rico. Plaintiff contended
that COSGA, the Harter Act and the Shipping Act did not govern
because they were not invoked specifically in the complaint, and
argued that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico enjoys sovereign
immunity from suit in federal court. The district court for Puerto
Rico denied plaintiff's request, and held that the language of these
three acts demonstrates a congressional intent that they should apply
in situations such as the instant case regardless of whether they are
specifically alleged in the complaint. Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S.
Co., 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955), supported the court's
argument that the mere averment of transportation by water in the
complaint brings into play these statutes. The court also found ample
precedent permitting a federal court to take judicial cognizance of
these acts. The court finally held that when the sovereign has
sufficient interest in the outcome of litigation to become a plaintiff, it
waives its right to plead sovereign immunity, a doctrine available only
when the sovereign is being sued for damages, and which will not
prevent removal to another court. PuertoRico v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 964 (D. P.R. 1970).

HALF-DISTANCE

RULE

Is

DEPENDENT

ON

REMOTELY FORESEEABLE

POSSIBILITY OF COLLISION

Petitioner's tanker was proceeding upstream on the Oregon side of
the Columbia River when it sighted visually and by radar respondent's
tugboat and barge heading downstream one and one-half miles ahead.
The tugboat and barge became engulfed in a fog along the Washington
shore. The captain of the tugboat then misjudged the tanker's position
by mistaking the direction of its fog signal and, in an avoidance
maneuver, executed a left U-turn across the shipping channel. When
the tugboat unexpectedly emerged from the fog, the tanker went full
Spring, 1973
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astern to decrease her headway but was unable to avoid being hit by
the oncoming barge. In its admiralty action, petitioner contended that
respondent was negligent in navigating the tugboat. The District Court
for the District of Oregon held the tugboat and barge solely at fault.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that petitioner also was negligent in violating the "half-distance" rule,
33 U.S.C. § 192 (1970), which establishes a standard used to
determine whether a maritime speed is moderate under the prevailing
weather conditions. The test is whether a vessel is able to stop in
one-half the distance at which a converging vessel is first sighted. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, and held the tugboat solely
liable for the collision because the half-distance rule did not apply in
this specific case. The Court found that the reason for the halfdistance rule was not present here because it was unrealistic, on the
facts of the case, for petitioner to anticipate the possibility that
respondent would execute its totally unorthodox maneuver and thus
intersect petitioner's path. Union Oil Co. v. Tugboat San Jacinto, 409
U.S. 140 (1972), rev'g 451 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 197.1).

3. ALIENS
ALIEN

ILLEGALLY

WORKMEN'S

IN

THE

UNITED

COMPENSATION

STATES

BENEFITS

Is

UNLESS

NOT BARRED FROM
EMPLOYMENT

CON-

TRACT AIDS ILLEGAL ENTRY

Plaintiff illegally entered the United Staes from Mexico, found
employment and subsequently brought suit against defendant to
recover under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant
contended that petitioner's illegal entry voided his work contract and,
therefore, prohibited his recovery of workmen's compensation benefits. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld plaintiff's right to
recover compensation benefits and ruled that violation of the
immigration laws does not alone prevent recovery under the state
workmen's compensation act. The court found that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution
protect an alien's right to enter contractual obligations and to seek
judicial redress. Noting also that a contract whose performance
violates the law is void, the court reasoned that since plaintiff's
contract of employment did not aid his illegal entry, he could recover
workmen's compensation benefits. Commercial Standard Fire &
Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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ALIEN WHO OVERSTAYS NONIMMIGRANT VISA Is NOT EXEMPT FROM
DEPORTATION

Petitioner overstayed his nonimmigrant visitor visa in order to
remain in the United States with his permanent resident children.
Petitioner then appealed his deportation ruling, claiming an exemption
from deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970). The court found
that the clear meaning of the statute exempts from deportation only
alients who obtained entry into the United States by fraud and have
permanent resident children in the United States. The court
determined that since petitioner entered the United States legally,
section 1251(f) did not provide an exemption from deportation.
Pirzadian v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ., 41 U.S.L.W. 2397
(8th Cir. Jan. 25, 1973).

ALIEN MUST INTEND

His

RETURN TO

TO INTERRUPT HIS RESIDENTIAL STATUS FOR

BE AN

"ENTRY"

ON WHICH

DEPORTATION CAN BE

PREDICATED

Petitioner, a Mexican national admitted to the United States in
1963 as a permanent resident, returned to Mexico in 1970 to pay a
family condolence call. While in Mexico, petitioner was approached by
four Mexicans who asked his aid in effecting illegal entry into the
United States. Petitioner helped the four Mexicans, and on his return
to the United States was convicted for aiding an illegal entry. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service then ordered petitioner's
deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(13) (1970), which provides for
the deportation of an alien who, within 5 years after any "entry,"
has aided the illegal entry of another. The Board of Immigrations
Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
374 U.S. 449 (1963), however, that an "entry" for the purpose of
deportation does not include the return from a brief foreign visit made
by the resident alien without any intention of abandoning his United
States resident status. Relying on that decision, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the deportation order and found that
petitioner's return to the United States did not constitute a deportable
"entry." The court noted three factors in its decision, including the
length of absence from the United States, the need to obtain special
travel documents and the purpose of the visit. Finding that petitioner
did not intend to interrupt his residential status, the court held that
petitioner could not be deported under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(13).
Vargas-Banuelos v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 466 F.2d
1371 (5th Cir. 1972).
Spring, 1973

CASE DIGEST

4. AVIATION
AN AIRLINE HIJACKING IS AN "ACCIDENT"
ACTION

AGAINST

AIRLINE

UNDER

GIVING RISE TO CAUSE OF

ARTICLE

17

OF WARSAW

CON-

VENTION

On September 6, 1970, armed members of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine hijacked defendant's aircraft, scheduled for
a direct flight from Zurich, Switzerland, to New York, and forcibly
diverted the plane to a desert airstrip near Amman, Jordan. Plaintiff, a
passenger on defendant's aircraft, was forced to remain in Amman
until the eleventh of September. Plaintiff brought an action for bodily
injury and mental anguish under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
as modified by the Montreal Agreement of 1966. The liability rules of
article 17 impose air carrier liability only on proof of the occurrence
of an "accident." Defendant contended that hijacking is not an
accident within the meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
and moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim
on which relief could be granted. The district court for the Southern
District of New York held that a hijacking constitutes an accident
under the Convention and, therefore, raises the presumption of air
carrier liability. Analogizing hijacking to sabotage, the court reasoned
that the intent of the parties to the Montreal Agreement to render
airlines liable to victims of sabotage should apply equally to hijacking,
and also found that the policy of the Convention to redistribute the
costs involved in air transportation supported its holding. The court
reasoned that the carrier was best qualified initially to develop
defensive mechanisms to avoid hijacking, and thereafter most capable
of assessing and insuring against the risks associated with air
transportation. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., Ltd., 351 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
5.

CITIZENSHIP

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON CITIZENSHIP Is NOT VIOLATIVE OF TITLE

VII

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Plaintiff, a lawfully admitted resident alien of Mexican origin, was
denied employment by defendant Farah Manufacturing Co. Plaintiff
alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her national
origin, a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff was not hired because she was not a
United States citizen. The court agreed with defendant that since
90 per cent of its employees were of Mexican origin, plaintiff had
Vol. 6-No. 2
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not been discriminated against on the basis of her national origin.
Therefore, the issue before the court was whether the words "national
origin" in title VII include citizenship. Even though the meaning of
"national origin" is plain, the court looked to the legislative history of
the Act and found that "national origin" was meant to have its plain
meaning. Therefore, the court found that discrimination on the basis
of citizenship is not violative of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Espinoza v. FarahMfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1972) (No. 671).
THREE-YEAR CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIRED FOR NATURALIZATION Is

NOT BROKEN WHEN PETITIONER RELIES ON GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION AND LIVES ABROAD WHILE CITIZEN HUSBAND SERVES
IN THE PEACE CORPS

Petitioner, a French national and the wife of an American citizen,

filed a petition for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), which
requires three years continuous residence. Petitioner had lived for
more than three years in Senegal while her husband worked there for
the Peace Corps. Before leaving the United States, petitioner had
received erroneous assurances from the Immigration and Naturalization Service that her residence in Senegal would not break her three
years continuous residence. On her return to the United States,
however, petitioner was denied naturalization. The district court of St.

Thomas and St. John, Virgin Islands, reversed the order determining
that although the statute should be strictly interpreted, recent cases
have made exceptions to strict interpretation. The court reasoned that
congressional intent would be satisfied in this case if petitioner were

allowed naturalization since she was the wife of a citizen who worked
for the United States Government. The court further held the
Government estopped from denying petitioner naturalization since she

had relied on incorrect information given her by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. In re LaVoie, 349 F. Supp. 68 (D. St. Thomas
& St. John, V.I. 1972).
STATE

STATUTES

STATES
TECTION

CITIZENS
CLAUSES

REQUIRING

STATE

CONTRAVENE
ABSENT

A

EMPLOYEES

SUPREMANCY
COMPELLING

TO

AND
STATE

BE

UNITED

EQUAL

PRO-

INTEREST

IN

PROTECTING STATE FISCAL INTERESTS AND RESOURCES

Plaintiff Miranda was eighteen years of age and a permanent
resident alien continuously residing in Arizona for over fifteen years.

Plaintiff applied for parttime employment with the Tucson School
Spring, 1973
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District in a Work-Study Program sponsored by the District under the
Vocational Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. (1970). Plaintiff
satisfied all the requirements for enrollment in the federally sponsored
and subsidized program, and was accepted for employment. One
month later defendants terminated plaintiff's employment for the sole
reason that she was a noncitizen of the United States. Plaintiff
Huxtable was twenty-eight years of age and an alien having the status
of a permanent resident and holding a permanent visa. The Arizona
State Personnel Commission rejected plaintiff Huxtable's application
for employment as a social service worker and teacher solely because
of her alienage. In both instances the defendants, inter alia the
Attorney General of Arizona and the Chairman of the Arizona State
Personnel Commission, acted pursuant to article 18, § 10 of the
Constitution of Arizona and section 38-201, subsection B of the
Arizona Revised Statutes, which barred state employment of noncitizens. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, contending that these Arizona statutes contravened the United States
Constitution and deprived plaintiffs of their rights and immunities
under the equal protection and supremancy clauses. Defendants, citing
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), argued the state right to
distinguish between its citizens as one class and its resident aliens as
another class in the allocation of public wealth and resources under
the theory of a state's "special public interest" in protecting and
preserving its wealth and resources for its citizens. The district court
for the District of Arizona held for the plaintiffs. The court found
that any state legislative attempt to exclude permanent resident aliens
from any lawful employment solely because of alienage violates the
supremacy clause. Following the rationale of Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971), the court reasoned that the discriminatory acts
were neither compelling nor substantially and rationally connected to
the protection of Arizona fiscal interests or resources. Miranda v.
Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D. Ariz. 1972).

6.
THE

EUROPEAN

PENSATION

COURT

HUMAN RIGHTS
OF

FOR A VIOLATION

HUMAN

RIGHTS

WILL

OF THE CONVENTION

TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL

ORDER

COM-

FOR THE PRO-

FREEDOMS

Petitioner, an Austrian citizen, appealed to the European Court of
Human Rights, claiming that his detention for more than two years
during his Austrian trial violated his right to a prompt judicial
proceeding, guaranteed in article 5, section 3 of the Convention for
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the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The
Court found for petitioner. The Austrian Federal Minister of Justice,
however, refused to make pecuniary reparation for the damage
allegedly caused petitioner by the Austrian Government, and instead
deducted the detention time from the prison sentence imposed on
petitioner at the trial. The European Commission of Human Rights, at
petitioner's request, then applied to the European Court of Human
Rights for "just satisfaction" on the grounds that the Austrian
Government had refused to compensate and thus had violated article
50 of the Convention. The Austrian Government contended that the
Court could not adjudicate petitioner's separate claims for prompt
trial and for compensation, and that the availability of an internal
remedy for full reparation for Austria's violation of article 5, section 3
obviated petitioner's right to compensation under article 50 of the
Convention. The Court again found for petitioner, reasoning that the
administration of justice would be facilitated by the consideration of a
compensation claim by the same judicial body that found a violation
of the Convention. Additionally, the Court rejected the Austrian
Government's contention that the deduction of time spent in
detention from petitioner's sentence was full reparation for the
violation of article 5, section 3. The Court reasoned that the
acceptance of the Government's argument would deprive article 5,
section 3 of its effectiveness, especially when the person detained is
found guilty. Ringeisen Case (European Court of Human Rights, June
22, 1972), 11 Int'l Legal Materials 1065 (1972).
7. IMPORT-EXPORT
IMPORTER OF RAW SUGAR CANNOT PROTEST ADDITIONAL CUSTOMS

DUTY WHEN No PROOF OF SUGAR'S REFINEMENT IS OFFERED WITHIN
THE PRESCRIBED TIME PERIOD

Appellant, an importer, protested the assessment of an additional

duty, under Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) item
901.00, 19 U.S.C. § 1202, on his importation of raw sugar into the

United States. Item 901.00 imposes an additional tax on imported
sugars that are not to be refined or improved in quality in the United
States. The Customs Court upheld this duty, and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed. The courts found that the
temporary item 901.00 tax automatically attaches to all goods,
including sugars, dutiable under TSUS item 155.20. The intention of
901.00 to follow the imported item into consumption then makes the

tax subject to rule 10(e)(ii) of the general interpretive rules of TSUS,
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19 U.S.C. § 1202. This rule, inter alia, prevents imposition of the
901.00 tax on proof of the sugar's actual refinement or improvement
within three years of the entry date. Since appellant did not prove
refinement or improvement of the raw sugar within the prescribed
time period, the courts upheld the item 901.00 duty. CzarnikowRionda Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 211 (C.C.P.A. 1972).

DEBTS OWED OWNER OF COMPANY CONFISCATED BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE PAID EVEN THOUGH DEBTS WERE PAID TO THE CUBAN
GOVERNMENT

In 1960, the Government of Cuba confiscated the factories and
principal assets of plaintiffs, the five leading Cuban manufacturers of
Havana cigars. The Cuban Government designated "interventors" to
assume complete control of the companies on behalf of the
Government. The interventors then continued to export the cigars to
defendants, United States cigar importers, under their customary
brand names and trademarks registered in the United States. Defendants thereafter paid the interventors only for the cigars shipped to
them before the confiscation. Plaintiff-owners brought this action,
demanding payment from defendants for the value of the cigars
shipped before the confiscation and asserting trademark infringement
and unfair competition by defendants and interventors in their
continuing cigar transactions. The interventors joined the action and
claimed payment due for cigars shipped after the confiscation.
Defendants admitted the interventors' right to payment, but denied
any liability to the previous owners. Defendants alleged that prior
payments to the interventors properly discharged their debt for all
preintervention shipments. The court found that the debts in question
were located in the United States because a debt follows the debtor, in
this case the American importers. The court, citing Republic of Iraq v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), refused to
recognize the right of the Cuban Government to receive payment for
the preintervention cigar shipments, either under the Cuban decrees of
confiscation (which had no effect on debts constituting property in
the United States because the intervention was not consistent with the
policy and law of the United States) or under subsequent Cuban
currency regulations. Thus the court held that the importers must pay
the previous owners, optionally by means of a setoff against the
money the importers owed the interventors. The court found
trademark infringements by defendants and interventors under
sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1114(1)
and 1125(a) (1970). The court awarded no damages for trademark
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infringements, however, because there was no evidence that either the
owners' reputations or the trademarks themselves were tarnished.
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
8. JURISDICTION
CRUISE

SHIP LINE'S SALES

CONTROL

OVER RESIDENT

AGENTS AND

IN-STATE BUSINESS CALLS ARE SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION
UNDER UTAH LONG ARM STATUTE

Petitioner, a Utah corporation, appealed an order quashing service
of process in an action against defendant, a nonresident cruise ship
line having its principal office in Rotterdam. Petitioner contended that
defendant had sufficient Utah contacts under the test derived from
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to subject
it to in personam jurisdiction under the Utah long arm statute. In the
instant case, defendant had authorized eighteen or nineteen Utah
travel agents to sell bookings under agency contracts in which
defendant had substantially delineated the agents' sales procedures.
Furthermore, defendant's officials had called on plaintiff and the
travel agents in Utah. The Supreme Court of Utah held that these facts
exhibited sufficient minimum contacts with Utah under International
Shoe to subject the defendant cruise ship line to in personam
jurisdiction under the Utah statute. ForeignStudy League v. HollandAmerica Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244, cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1972).

9. TAXATION
EVIDENCE
PANIES

SOLELY

OF

CONTROLLED

INTERNAL

BY

SAME

TRANSACTIONS

INTEREST

Is

NOT

BETWEEN

COM-

SUFFICIENT TO

OVERCOME ALLOCATION OF INCOME UNDER IRC SECTION

482

Lufkin Foundry and Machine Company (Lufkin), a Texas Corporation, sold machinery to Lufkin Foundry and Machine Company
International (Lufkin International), and to Lufkin Overseas Corporation, S.A. (Lufkin Overseas), both wholly owned subsidiaries of
Lufkin. Lufkin International received a 20 per cent discount from
Lufkin for all machinery sold to Lufkin Machine Co., Ltd. (Lufkin
Canada), a Canadian corporation wholly owned by Lufkin, and a 20
per cent commission on all other sales. Lufkin Canada received a 10
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per cent discount from Lufkin International. Lufkin also granted
Lufkin Overseas a 20 per cent discount on all its sales of Lufkin
machinery. The Commissioner, exercising his power under section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code to allocate income items between
controlled businesses to prevent tax evasion or to reflect income
clearly, allocated to Lufkin 50 per cent of the commissions paid
Lufkin International and Lufkin Overseas, and 50 per cent of the
discount given Lufkin International on its sales to Lufkin Canada.
Petitioner Lufkin then sued to overturn this allocation of income. The
Commissioner enjoys a presumption of correctness in a section 482
allocation that may be overcome only by the presentation of evidence
sufficient to establish that the discounts and commissions distributed
would not have varied had an uncontrolled taxpayer dealt at arm's
length with Lufkin. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(6)(1) (1972). In the Tax
Court, Lufkin presented evidence prepared by an independent
certified public accountant of the reasonableness of the discounts and
commissions. The Tax Court held this evidence sufficient to overcome
the Commissioner's presumption of correctness. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the sole issue was whether any
quantum of evidence concerning a taxpayer's internal transactions
with its subsidiaries, standing alone, is sufficient to establish arm's
length dealing between them. The Commissioner argued that Lufkin
must produce some probative evidence of prices charged between
unrelated and uncontrolled companies in order to rebut the presumption. Lufkin contended, however, that it is possible to comply with
the standard of proof for rebuttal by producing and analyzing
evidence of its own marketing arrangements. The court reversed the
Tax Court decision, and held that evidence of similar business
activities between uncontrolled taxpayers must be offered to rebut the
presumption of correctness in favor of the Commissioner. The court
reasoned that, under 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-2 (1972), a court can discern
whether a disparity in tax treatment exists only if it has evidence of
what has occurred in arm's length situations. The court therefore
remanded this case to the Tax Court to allow Lufkin to present the
proper evidence. Lufkin Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Comm'r, 72-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 85,508 & 85,865 (5th Cir. 1972).

Vol. 6-No. 2

724

